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In June of 1994 a 20-m section of 1.4-m diameter, restrained-joint, ductile iron pipe failed during construction of a new section of 
water pipeline for the city of Cairo in the Arab Republic of Egypt. The failure occurred in an area where the pipe was supported on 
piles, and compacted silica sand was w .. cd as side support for the pipe. Soil above the crown of the failed section of pipe was 6 m or 
more in thickness. Results Df a detailed review of the failure revealed that a number of unique and related factors apparently caused the 
failure. The most significant of these causes was the native soil surrounding the pipeline, which \Vas formed from an accumulation of 
800 years of building and construction debris. At the location of the failure the debris was in excess of 15-m thick. When subjected to 
water at this location, thi.-. debris undcr\-\'cnt signiril:ant settlement, which eventually led to loss in .-.ide support for the pipeline. To 
repair the pipeline and to avoid future similar failure~. a utilidor \Vas used to protect the pipeline in areas where overburden thickness 
was greater than 4.5 m, and a pip~: encasement was used \.vhere the. overburden thickness was less. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June of 1994 a 20-m scctiun of a 1 A-m diameter \Vater 
pipeline for the Rod El Farag \Vater Distribution System !~tiled 
during water pressure testing. The failure occurrcJ less than 
3 months before final comrnis~ioning of this SIOO± million 
(US) water system upgrade for the city· of Cairo in the Arah 
Republic of Egypt. The failure was attributed to unique soil 
conditions existing at the site. Implication.'> or the failure \Vt:rc 
scnous: it brought into LJUCstiun the entire de~ign of the 
pipeline sy~tcm, as well as the foundation support system for 
three SU-m diameter. cast-in-place, post-tensioned concrete 
water rcscrvotrs, which had recently been l:onstructed ncar the 
area of failure. This p::tpcr describes geotechnical 
investig::ttions that \Vcrc carried out to investigate the cau!'e of 
the pipeline failurc, the ~uitability of pile-supported structures 
at the site. and the repair procedures that were completed tn 
put the pipeline back into operation and to prevent future 
similar failures. 
Project Description 
The Rod El Farag ·water Distribution System Upgrade Project 
involved installation of 18 km of restrained-joint. ductile iron 
pipe in the mid and norlh sections of lhe East Bank of Cairo 
(Fig. I). The project \\'as constructed to provide drinking water 
to this heavily populated and rapidly growing area. Funding 
for the project wa~ from the govcrnrnenb of the Arab Republic 
of Egypt and the United States: pro1ect administration was 
being: handled by the General Organization for Greater Cairo 
Vlatcr Supply (GOGC\\lS) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (liS AID): CH2M HILL 
International, in association w·ith two Egyptian firms, Dr. 
Ahmed Abdel Warith and United Consultants, designed the 
upgrade and were providing engineering and construction 
managi..'nK'nt services at the time of the failure. The 
construction L·ontractor was Morrison Knudsen. 
Fourth International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
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Fig I Map (!f greater Cairo. 
The pipeline failure occurred ncar one of the nnvly 
constructed 80-rn diameter reservoir:-,. Each rcscrvmr has a 
1.4-m diameter pipeline that connects it to a 1.4-m diameter 
transmission main. The distance from the reservoirs to the 
transmission main ranged from 70 to 130 m. A 10-m hy 15-m 
altitude valve vault (AVV) i.-, located bcl\vccn each re~ervoir 
and the transmission main to adjust v..ratcr line pressures. The 
pipe failure occurred along a 20-m section at Reservoir I 
between the A VV and the reservoir. \vhcrc approximately 
6.5 m of fill were located above the crown of the pipeline. 
Geotechnical Conditiom. Geotechnical conditions in the area 
of the failure were reported by United Engineers as consisting 
of 15 to 25m of dry fill over a dense sand layer. Locally, the 
dry fill is referred to a:-. the Darassa fill. It consists of gravel, 
sand, silt, crushed brick, pottery, bones, and traces of organic 
material. The Darassa fill is thought Lo he "building debris" 
that was discarded over an ROO-year period ju.:.t outsllle of the 
Old Wall of Cairo, after the wall was constructed in the 12th 
century. l3lov.icounts from standard penetration tests (SPTs) in 
the fill typically range from 15 to 20 blows per :w em and arc 
up to 40 blows per 30 em ncar the lmttom of the fill. Direct 
shear test values for the fill were reported to range from 37 to 
41". The sand helm.v the Darassa fill 1s Jcn:-.c to very dense in 
consistency with SPT hlowcnunts in excess of 50. 
Groundwater is located 12 to 15m helO\\' the top or the dense 
sand. The material in the upper 2 to 4 rn of Darassa fill appears 
to be very dry becoming somewhat moist at deplh \Vith 
moisture cont~.:nts of 30 1k, or less. 
Foundation Svstcms. Rccogni1ing the heterogeneous 
characteristics of the Darassa fill, the designers required that 
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all major structures. such as the AVVs and the HO-m diameter 
rcscrwms, be on cast-In-place deep foundations supported in 
the dense sand belo'>v the Darassa fill. The piles \Vere located 
in the dense sand layer to avoid localited settlement, which 
V...'as expected to occur when voids and loose areas within the 
Darassa fill settled, shifted, or collapsed. 
In the case or the pipeline.-,, piles were required where fill 
th1ckncss ahove the crmvn of the pipe '>vas 1n excess of 3 to 
4 m. The pipeline support system consisted of a 2-m wide by 
0.4-m thick pile cap located on 0.4-m diameter Delta piles, a 
proprietary driven/cast-in-place C(mcrctc pile commonly used 
in southern Europe and north Africa. The Delta piles were 
located in a t\vo-hent configuration with center-to-center 
spacing of 1.2 m and bc.nt spacing of 4.5 m. The piles were 
designed as end hearing piles. Allowances \Vere included in 
design for dmvndrag from the settlement of the Darassa fill. 
The capacity of the Delta pile was confirmed during tht.: early 
phases or construction by conducting High Strain Dynamic 
Tt:sts (HSDT) \Vith an energy of approximately 20 KJ and a 
static pik-load test. Ultimate geotechnical capacities of the 
Delta piles were estimated from these tests to he greater than 
3 MN \Vhich exceeded the original design capacity. 
The pipeline was located on a 30-cm thick ,<.,and bedding 
placed on the pile cap. The width or the pipe trench was 
typically two pipe diameters beyond the edge of the pile cap; 
trench V..'ails were normally excavated at ncar vertical to 
heights in excess of' 7 m. Backfill placed in the trench around 
the pipeline was an imported clean silica sand compacted to 
YYk of its maximum dry density determined by standard 
Proctor methods. 
The reservoirs and AVV-.. w~.:re supported on 0.6-m diameter 
drilled shafts with the toe of the shafts located at least 3m into 
the dense sand hearing layer. HSDTs and static pile-load tests 
were conducted on a limited number of these drilled shafts 
during the early phases of construction. The mobilization 
energy of the HSDT was approximately 40 KJ. Ullimate 
gl::otcdmical capacities of the shafts were estimated from these 
tcst.s to b.;; greater than 5.5 "tvlN, exceeding the original design 
capacity. 
A ngorous inspection program was followed during 
construction to assun; that a high-quality upgrade project 
would rc:-.ult. Construction monitoring included continuous on-
site inspection hy the designer's engineers, frequent laboratory 
testing of concrete and sand products, and close conformance 
to the dc~ign drawings and specifications. 
Pipeline Failure 
During inspection of A VV I in June of 1994. water was 
observed to be trickling through a pipe penetration in the wall 
of the A VV. In an effort to ddcrminc the source of the water, 
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drained and inspected. Dunng that inspectio n. the engineering 
stall observed tha t the d1t11neter of the pipe had dcf'ormed 
downv. ard from I 0 to 20Ch. and the diameter at the spring I inc 
of the pipe had increased in a similar amount. These 
measurements Indicated that the pipe had <walled. the extent o l 
wh1ch was suflic1ent to hreak the seal at the pipe joints. 
POST-FAILURE l::.VALUATIONS 
FoiiO\\ing d1scuss10ns \vith USAID and GOGCWS 
rcpresentatl\es. the pipelmes between the three reservoirs and 
the AVVs and between the A VVs and the transmission main 
were exposed ( I ) to dewrmine the extent and potentia l cause 
of the failure be tween Reservoir I and AVV I a nd (2) to 
investigate wntlitions of the other pipe lines that had been 
constructed under similar condit ions. Test pits were dug below 
the bouom of the pile cap at the failure location to inspect 
conditiOns immelliately helow the pile cap. The interiors of 
the ptpcs for Reservmrs 2 and 3 were also inspected to 
detenmne if the) had deflected in a manner s imilar to what 
\\as observed at Resen o i r I . 
Obsen at ions after Excavations 
The (l\'all ing of the p1pe at Reservoir I was clearly visible 
when the backfill was removed (Fig. 2). The deformations of 
the 1walled pipe sections were sufficient to cause the concrete 
lining of some of the most heavi ly deformed areas to c rack and 
fall away. The pile cap was also extensively damaged over a 
23-m distance. with the Delta piles typically punching up 
through the pile cap in a number of locations (Fig. 3). The 
sand fill that was removed in this area was very wet (e.g .. 
moisture contents 111 excess of 50'h ). relative to when it was 
placed and relative to the surrounding Darassa fill. 
Perhaps the most interesting observation made after the 
pipeline and pile cap were exposed 111 the area of fai lure was 
the nearly 30 cm v01d that existed between the bottom of the 
pile cap and the top of the original fill. This void occurred 
after construction. as the pile cap had heen cast o n a mud slab 
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Fig. 3 Punching shear failure of DeliO pile through pile cap. 
that had been poured on the fill. The sell lement was not 
d1rectly related to the height of overburden. For example, next 
to Reservoir I where the height o f overburden was nearly 
7.5 m, the void was less than a few cenlllneter .... There was abo 
no damage to the pipe at th1s location. The sand fill 
surrounding the pipeline at this location wa.., relatively dry, 
similar in moisture content to its onginal placement condi tion. 
A second revealing observation was also made 1n the area of 
the pipe failure. Along with the settlement, there was as much 
as 17 e m of s ilica sand between the bottom o f the pile cap and 
the top o f the mud slab. This s ilica sand was the same sand that 
had originally been placed as trench backfill. Laminations of 
irregular thickness were visible in the sand. suggesting that the 
sand had flowed from the trench into the void on more than 
one occasion . It was la ter hypothcsi;ed that the sand had been 
washed into the void by water that had accumulated in the 
trench when a connector pipeline leaked (F•g. 4). 
Inspections between A VV I and the transmission main. where 
the height of soil above the crown of the pipe ranged from 
4.5 m to 1.5 m, found no obvious -.1gns of damage to the 
pipeline or pile cap. although from 10 to 47 em of settlement 
had occurred beneath the pile cap at one location. Results of 
the inspection of the other pipel1 ncs a rc summari;ed 1n 
Table I. The maximum deflection of the pipeline at these other 
locations was less than 5'h. 
As was a lso observed in the area of pipel ine failure. hackfill 
conditions were generally wet in areas of maximum settle ment. 
relative to their placement condition. A review of field records 
determined that numerous cases o l water leakage had been 
recorded by the construc tio n inspectmn staff 111 the vicinity of 
the settled areas. The cause of the leaka"e ranned from leakin<> e e e 
utility lines for construcllon support fac.:i lit1es to leaky 
connectors on the pipelines. For example. at Re"crvo1r I the 
source of the leak was a faulty saddle connection between the 
1.4-m pipeline and a 100-mm dram p1pe. at Rcscno1r 3 the 
area of maximum seulement comc1ded \\llh one of the 
contractor's temporary utility lines. Fourth International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
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With the exception of the a<..:tual area of failure, the amount of 
silica sand found hcncath the pile cap in other areas where 
settlement had occurred was minimal. suggcsling that the 
amount of water flow at these other locations had not been 
sufficient to wash the sand from the trench into the void 
beneath the pi lc cap. 
An elevation survey was also conducted on the pile cap after 
the pipelines were exposed. Results of this survey indicated 
that the settlement of the pile cap for the undarnag:cd sections 
of the pile cap was ncgli!_!ihlc. On-the-other-hand. there v,-as 
clear evidence of ~cttlcrncnt of the pile cap in the areas that 
had failed. Although the rnovemenl of the damaged section 
was thought to be due to the punching shear failure resulting in 
the pile cap moving downward relative to the piles and not due 
to pile movement, the movement did introduce the possibility 
that the Delta piles might have plunged downward some 
Table 1. Summary of settlement measurements and damage survey. 
Location Overburden Height 
(ml 
Reservoir I 
Reservoir to A VV 7.5 to 5.0 
A VV In Transmission ~~lain 4.0 to 1.5 
Reservmr 2 
Reservoir to A VV 7.5to5.0 
AVV to Transmission !v1ain 4.0 to 2.() 
Reservoir 3 
Reservoir to A VV 7.5 to 1.6 
AVV to Transmi~sion Main 1.6 
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unknO\vn amount during the pipeline failure. 
Geotechnical Assessment 
Thc post-failure geotechnical assessment included 
geotechnical explorations, laboratory testing, pile integrity 
tcsting. pipeline capacity evaluations, and a reanalysis of pile 
capacitics for all pile-supported structures. 
The geotechnical explorations included five borings drilled hy 
hand-auger bucket methods (Fig. 5) through the Darassa fill 
apprnxirnah:ly I to 2 m into the underly1ng dense sand. 
Modified pcnt'tration tests using a 100-mm outer diameter hy 
:-n-rnm inner diameter split-spoon sampler driven hy a 64 kg 
hammer were conducted at approximately 1-m intervals in the 
Darassa fill; SPTs were conducled in the dense sand 
underlying the Darassa fill. The ohjcctivcs of these 
explorations were ( 1) to determine the consistency of the fill 
and sand in areas where maximum settlement had occurred and 
(2) to collect representative samples of soil for lahoratory 
classification testing. Undisturbed hlock samples of the soil 
were also obtained from the test pits dug below the pile cap. 
In general result:-, of these explorations were very consistent 
with those performed as part of the original design. 
Blov,.'i.:ounts from the modified penetration tests and the SPTs 
\vcrc similar to those recorded previously. Laboratory tests 
confirmed that the Darassa fill \Vas a rnixlure of gravel, sand, 
sill, and clay-size materials \Vith from 50 to 80% sand-size or 
coarser. \Vater contents for samples ranged from less than 10 
to as much as 50!/c'. with the highest values being recorded in 
the vicinity of the pipeline break. Consolidation tests 
conducted on specimens trimmed from the block samples 
suggc~1ed that vertical strains would be up to 3% when water 
\.vas aJd('J after consolidating the samples to the estimated 
overburden pressure. 
After removal of the damaged pile cap, pile integrity testing 
\Vas conducted on the 0.4-m diameter Delta piles by Pile 
Testing of Egypt to determine if the piles between Reservoir 1 
l\·Jaximum Settlement Damage 
beneath Pile Cap (em) 
30 failed pipe and pile cap 
47 None 
< I to 2 No damage 
30 No damage 
40 Minor hairline cracks to pile cap 
o-
_) No damage Fourth International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
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Fig. 5 Hand-auger bucket soil boring. 
and A YV I had been damage hy the failure. Results showed 
that all hut one pile was intact. The damaged pile had 
compressive and tensile cracking in the upper I m. 
Subsequemly. the upper I m of this pile was removed and 
replaced. 
Axial capacity analyses were conducted to confirm that the 
plunging, downdrag. and structural capacities were sufficient, 
in light of the overburden loads and the potential for large 
downdrag load~. The Unified Method of Design described in 
the Canadian Foundation Engineering Manual (CFEM. 1985) 
was u~ed in performing these analyses, similar to the original 
design. With the Un ified Method, downdrag is assumed to be 
mobilited under very little relative movement between the pile 
and soi l. and undoubtedly much less than would occur at the 
Darassa site. The only question in these analyses was the Beta 
value to usc for the pile or shaft resistance factor. After review 
of the available pile-load test data and discussions with 
Professor Bengt Fcllcnius. a consultant to CH2M HILL on the 
project. an average Beta of 0.2 with a range of 0. 15 to 0.3 was 
selected for the Delta pile. For drilled shafts a Beta value of 
0.3 wi th a range of 0.25 to 0.35 was used. The toe resistance 
factors. N,. were 60 and 30 for the Delta pile and drilled shaft, 
respectively. The different Beta and toe resistance factors for 
the Delta piles and the drilled shafts reflected the different 
construction methods. 
For the pipeline and pile capacity reanalysis. overburden load 
computations accounted for positive and negative trench 
configurations recommended by Spangler and Handy ( 19X2) 
and within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ( 1978). A Cr = 2 
was used, which was consistent with the upper-bound value 
that was necessary to cause failure for a fixed-base condition 
with the outside soil sculing. Results of these analyse5 
confirmed that the factor of safety for plunging of the Delta 
piles exceeded 3. and the load factor for downdrag was greater 
than 1.2. The structural capacity to load ratio exceeded 1.2. 
where the load was defined as the dead load plus the downdrag 
load. 
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For the reservoirs. which were supported on 0.6-m diameter 
drilled shafts, load-deformation analyses were conducted using 
results of previously performed pile-loads tests and HSDTs to 
confirm that the capacities of the drilled shafts were consistent 
with the original design. These reanalyses determined that 
factors of safety for plunging and downdrag of the drilled 
shafts were greater than 3 and 1.7. respectively. The structural 
capacity had a load ratio of greater than 1.7. 
It was concluded from these analyses that the design of the 
Delta piles and the drilled shafts met normal requirements for 
the safe design of important structures. 
Structural Assessment 
The structural assessment included review of the load carrying 
capacity of the pile cap. as well as structural inspections and 
testing. Particular focus was placed on the allowable 
overburden for the pipeline. 
Results of this review determined that, if the soil loads above 
the pile cap were based on twit.:e the weight of the prism of soil 
over the pile cap (a conservative assumption of Cr = 2) and the 
pipe was filled with water. the pile cap. by itself. was suspect 
to support 7 m cover over the pipe. According to American 
Concrete Instituted Building Code Requirements for Structural 
Concrete (ACL 1995), the maximum overburden load for 
punching shear with CP = 2 would have been only 3.5 m, rather 
than the 6.5 m observed over the pipe. Observations at 
Reservoirs 2 and 3 indicated no damage. The dis~.:rcpancy 
between computed and observed behavior suggests either that 
a CP = 2 was too high or that the stiffness of the 1.4-m 
diameter ductile iron pipe relative to the pile cap influenced 
the capacity computation. In this Iauer case, with the pipe 
being roughly 15 times stiffer than the pile cap, loads could 
have been redistributed. In all likelihood some wmbination of 
the two explanations probably occuncd. 
Results of pipe coupon tests detennineu that the load carrying 
capacity of the ductile iron pipe, which was required to exceed 
a 60-42-10 criteria (60 ksi tensile strength; 42 ksi yield 
strength; and I 09'c minimum elongation), met or exceeded 
requirements. It was also concluded that if the soi I surrounding 
the pipe exceeded 90'K relative compaction according to the 
standard Proctor test, the pipe could support 9 m of 
overburden using a conservative assumption of soil load CCr = 
2), but that if the pipe lost side support, it could only support 
approximately 3 m of overburden. 
Fai lure Mechanisms and Implications 
From the observations made after the pipeline excavations, the 
geotechnical assessments, and the structural analyses, it was 
concluded that the failure was the result of a combination of 
high overburden pressures. soi I selllcmcnt. and water leakage. 
Fourth International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
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The combination was apparently a unique occurrence fmm the 
standpoint that other sections of the pipe that involved similar 
combinations nf ovcrhunk:n pressures. equal or greater soil 
settlement, and \Vater kakJg:e did not exhibit the failure. 
The specific cause of !'ailurc was postulatcJ to he as follov,:s: 
• A water leak at the saddle connection caused s1gmficant 
settlement in the Darassa fill he low the base of the pipe 
trench, resulting in a cavity forming beneath the pde cap. 
• The water saturated sanJ fill surrounding the pipe was 
slowly washed into the cavity below the pile cap, resulting 
in a progressive loss of side support along the springlinc 
of the pipe. 
• As the side support was lnst, the pipe dcl"ormed, 
eventually resulting in more water leakage from the \vatcr-
tight seals at the pipe joints and further flowing of the 
sand fill into the void. 
• The pile cap failed in punching shear when the pile cap-
pipeline-soil system adjusted to a new stale of equilibrium 
under the soil and water load:-.. 
The implications of the failure seemed to inJicatc that only 
pipelines supporting ovcrhurden heights in excess of 3 m were 
of concern. as the pipeline and pile cap could supporL at least 
3 m of overburden without siJe support. This led to the 
conclusion that only the sections of pipeline between the 
reservoirs and the AVYs \Verc at greatest ri~k. It also led to the 
conclusion that the failure mechanism did not directly involve 
the piles themselves, and therefore, repair should focus on 
protecting the pipeline from future occurrences of excessive 
settlement in the Darassa fill caused hy \Vater. 
FACJI.TTY REPAIR AND MODJHCATJONS 
Following completion of the post-failure evaluations. methods 
for rcpamng and modifying the facilities to handle 
consequences of large settlements of the Darassa fill were 
established. These repairs were bast~d on the understanding 
that the Darassa site ..,urrnunding the water supply facilities 
would be shared with the new Fl A.rhar Park under 
development by the Aga Khan Trust for Cullure. 
Initially, the repair program focused on the pipeline het\vcen 
the reservoirs and transmission mams. Ho\vcvcr. m 
anticipation of potential surface water infiltration and 
underground irrigation pipeline leaks from the new park. the: 
extent of the repair and modifications \Vas expanded to include 
most of the water l~~eilitics installed at the Dar;1ssa site. The 
criteria used in development and selection of the options 
included long-term usage of the facility. reliahili1y, 
constructihility, and schedule of completion. The.-,c \vhcre 
essential considerations. given the ptans for the future park. the 
need for complete approval hy the owner, and the fast-track 
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:-.chcdulc that would he required to minimize disruption to the 
start-of-service date of the \Vater facilities. 
Alternative Evaluation and Design 
The section of 1.4-m diameter pipe hetv-.:cen each of' the three 
reservoirs and the associated AVVs \Vas of primary concern 
because of the failure ncar Reservoir 1 and the high 
nverhurJen loads above the pipe and pile cap. The site and 
pipeline areas to be modified and/or repaired are shown in 
Fig. 6. From the post-fadure analysis it wa:-. concluded that the 
current pile cap and pipe support design could not handle the 
cornhination of large overburden pres:-.ure:-. and loss of side 
support. Alternatives were identified for repairing the pipeline 
ami pile cap conditions from Reservoir I and modifying 
conditions from Resenoirs 2 and 3 to the transmission main. 
Alternative~ \Vcre narrowed to tW{l potential options: ( 1) a 
reinforced concrete utilidor and (2) a concrete p1pe 
cnea~cment. A third option involving dual steel, welded wire 
fahric \\/ails (commonly referred to as a Hilfiker wall) with a 
reinforced concrete top slab spanning bet\vccn the v.'alls was 
also identified as a cost-effective variation to the concrete 
utilidor. However, construction of Hilfiker walls was unproved 
in Egypc therefore. the owner was unwilling to accept this 
approach. despite potentially significant cost savings. After 
funhcr review and di~cussions with the owner, Alternative 1 
\Vas selected for the pipeline section from the reservoirs to the 
AVVs. where the height of soil over the crown of the pipe was 
greater than 4.5 m; and Alternative 2 was selected for other 
areas '1-vhere overburden heights were less than 4.5 m and 
greater than 3.0 m. 
Utilidor Alternative. The proposed concrete utilidor, 
Alternative 1, is shown in Fig. 7. The design concept for the 
uti\idor v..•as to use the concrete structure to carry the trench 
overburden loads around the existing pipe, pile cap, and piles 
to new strip footings located on either side of the pile cap. The 
design concept was also to allow the utilidor structure above 
the pipe to settle independently and articulate according to the 
ground movement without affecting the pipeline. 
The utilidor consisted of precast concrete ··U"-shaped sections 
each approximately 3-m long and each spanmng 
appmxunatcly 4.6 m 'lvith a height of 4.1 m. The utilidor 
sections v-.-cre des1gm:d such that they were not connected to 
the footings nor tn each other, allowing differential movement 
to accommodate ground settlement. 
Each utilidor segment was supported by a relatively flexible, 
lightly rcmforccd concrete stnp footing 2-m wide and 0.5-m 
thil-k. To prevent backfill materials from entering between the 
scgmc:nts, a loosely laid nomvovcn geotextilc covered the 
exterinr face of the utilidor. In addition, the utilidor was 
developed with a manhole entrance at eilher end for human 
access to permit long-term visual inspection and maintenance 
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• Soil bonng 
Fig. 6 Durassa site with three rcsermirs, altitude mll:t' l:tmlrs, pile-supported pipeline. and transmission mains. 
of the pipeline. The owner vic\vcd the abiltty to inspcd the 
pipeline as a significant cnhant:crncnt to the design. 
Other appurtenances associated with the reservoir and piping 
system, including a 300-mm drainlinc. a 100-mm vvashdmvn 
pipeline. and instrumentation. control and electrical cables, 
were placed inside the utilidor. Again the owner viewed this 
location as benclicial from the standpoint of lung-term 
maintenance. \\lith this nev-i design concept. the method of 
supporting the 1.4-rn Jiametcr pipe was changed from the 
original sand fill to a pipe cradle on tup of the pile c:tp. 
During review of the utilidor concept. concerns were 
expressed abmn the additional lateral loading to the Delta piles 
from the nearby utilidor footings. Conn:rn" v.,·crc: also 
expressed about the potential for additional dovvndrag. 
Additional analyses were conducted to shmv that the pile 
system would pcrfmm adequately under these loads. 
Pipe Encasement Alternative. The concrete pipe encasement 
alternative involved a reinforced concrete encasement tn 
prevent ovalling of the pipe and provitle heam rigidity and 
punching shear resistance to the pik cap. This alternative was 
determined to be economically feasihlc in areas where the soil 
thickness above the cro\vn of the pipe was greater than 3.0 m 
and less than 4.5 rn. In areas with higher overburden, 
addition~d piling would have hcen required to carry the 
combined weight of the soil. encasement, and water-filled 
pipeline. The cost of adtlitional piles Vv'hen added to the cost of 
the pipe encasement was estimated to he much more expensive 
than the utilidor concept. 
The encasement \vas 2-m wide, matching the width of the 
existing pile cap and 40 ern above the top of the pipe. In 
addition, llexibility hct\vcen the encased p1pe and the pipe 
~.:ntning adpccnt pile-supported structures was provided by 
leaving the last t\vo pipe joinh uncascJ and free to rotate if 
needed. 
Other ConsiJerations. Linder each alternative, tlooding of the 
tn.:nch adjacent to the pipeline system (i.e., pipe, pile cap, and 
piles) was recommended as an inl.'xpcnsivc rnclhod ln induce 
subsurface ground settlement prior to reconstruction, which 
would reduce the amount of scttkrncnt occurring after Fourth International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
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construction. The amount of post-construction ~ettlerncnt wa~ 
particularly important for the utiltdor, a:-. it \\/tl!-> designed to 
accommodate a fixed amount of settlement before the utilidor 
would contact the pipeline. 
The pipe cradle supports were constructed prior to flooding. 
Settlement of the trench ground surfat:c, the pile cap. and 
adjacent pile-supported structures were monitored. After 
settlement of the llooUcd area had es.'>cntially stopped, the 
flooded area was dried and compacted. and construction of the 
utilidor and pipe encasement hcgan. 
Design Criteria 
Design criteria for the repair and modificatiml'i \vcre 
developed based on the alternatives selected for 
implementation. The criteria included the design site grading 
plan, as well as geotechnical and ..;tructural requirements for 
each alternative. Jn addition, criteria related to construction 
issues were cstahlisheJ. 
Overburden Loads. The design site grading plan. \\·hich \\'as 
developed during the post-failure evaluatinn, was cstahltshcd 
to estimate the maximum expected soil loads that could he 
imposed to the utilidor or pipe encasement protcctmg lh...- 1.4-
rn diameter p1pe, pile cap. and complete system. This grading 
plan exceeded the actual contract grading plan hy a-; much as 
2.0 m .. It \Vas set to accommodate the nc\v park construction 
and any associatcJ unforeseen rill and grading alterations that 
might occur in the future. At the highest point this plan 
SUi:!!!estcd that soil ovcrbun.Jcns could he as great as 7.3 m 
ab~:c the concrete utilidor. where the piping connected to the 
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rcscrvnir. Jn arca'i where the pipe encasement \vould be used, 
the maximum soil overburden used in design was 4.5 m. Tn 
areas in whil·h the soil ovcrhurden \\'as 3.0 m or less. no 
modirications to tht: pipeline system were required. 
Geotechnical and Structural Criteria. Geotechnical and 
structural dcsign criteria were c~tahhshed to determine the wall 
thtckness and su.c of the utilidor and the pipe encasement. 
Analyses were also conducted to determine hearing stresses 
and settlements for the utilidor footings. These analyses were 
based on Darassa fill characteri~tics that had been evaluated 
during the post-failure evaluation and monitored over the past 
4 years in the field during the site construction. 
A maximum settlement of I m was estimated from (1) the 
maximum ob~crvul settlement at the ground surface from 
induced \"''ater during construction and (2) vertical strain 
measurements made during the laboratory consolidation tests. 
A considerable degree of engineering judgment was required 
in making this estimate, as the zone in which the observed 
settlements occurred was unknown and the representativeness 
of the laboratory data was uncertain. Given these uncertainties, 
a safety ractor of 1.5 \'l.:as established between CH2M HILL 
and th~ owner. resulting in the clearance hetwecn the bottom 
or the utilidor and the top of the pipe at 1.5 111. 
Beneath the utilidor footing. a 0.5-m thick crushed rock base 
which is 0.5 m wider than the footing \vas placed to reduce the 
bearing stresses on the underlying filL to maintain support as 
the fill._ hencath the cap settles, and to minimize the potential 
for squeezing of soil into the void beneath the pile cap in the 
event of future settlement. 
Con!->truction Criteria. Constrw:tion criteria included setting the 
sequence of construction. Pip<:s were to be supported by the 
pipe cradle~ on thc pile. cap prior to the flooding. Flooding 
duration at each location \Vas to he monitored for settlement 
using seulcmcn1 plates. Further construction was not permitted 
until the rate or settlement was negligible. Pile repairs were to 
occur for piles hc1ween Reservoir I and the AVV I, as 
determined necessary by the pile integrity tests. This work was 
to occur on a fast-track scheUulc to minimize impacts to the 
.' ... tart-up and turn-over oft he facilities. 
Construct_ion 
The construction •,;~.rork was awarded to an experienced local 
Egyptian construction firm, Sami Rizallah Contractors. Bids 
rrom the pre-de.'-ign and final design ranged from a high of 
$0.0 million (US) hy a U.S_ based contractor. to the awarded 
hid of slidnlv under S6UO,OUO by Se!mJ Rizallah. Thc awarded 
hid wa.-, ..._ap~roxlmatcl)-.. S500,000 less than CH2M HILL's 
cstimatc. Skeptin-,rn on the completion and quality of work 
wa.-, apparent from the exp::1triatc community, particularly 
relative to meeting an aggressive construction schedule and the 
low contract hid amount. 
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NotH.:e to Proceed wa!-> g1\·en on February 1995. The actual 
constructiOn duration was approxn11atcly 5 months. \>.h1ch was 
w1thm the specified contract schedule. Work often proceeded 
111 douhlc sh1 fts and 6 to 7 days a week. 
The OYerall construction operation for the repa1rs and 
modifications was unique in Egypt, as the work was performed 
under a partnering agreement between CH2M HILL and the 
Egyptian contractor. Mo<.hlication or rehabilitation 
constru~:tlon worl-. can result 111 prem1um associated costs due 
to unforeseen adjustments to the design and slowed 
construction progress. However, the project philosophy of 
partnenng assured that the job was done as qu~ekly and 
smoothly as possible. Day-to-day adjustments and revisions 
-





Fig. 8 Utilidor consrmction ow!r 1.4-m diameter pipe. 
were made. as necessary. to the dc-.tgn by CH2M HILL with 
min1mal unpacts to the progress of the \.vork and the Egyptian 
contractor. In many instances. design modi licatlons were 
updated tn C:uro dunng the day. electronically transm111etl to 
the US lor senwr review dunng the night in Egypt (daytime in 
the US). and re\ ised for construction the followmg day in 
Cairo. As the work progressed, the project developed many 
features similar to a tlesign/builtl approach. CH2M HILL 
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expedited the work by assistmg the Egyptian contractor 111 the 
scheduling and administration of the daily work. 
Dunng: the work, the nood1ng and monitoring stage occurred 
within 7 to I 0 days. With rntnor subsurface '>elllements 
occun·ing at Reservoirs I and 3 and no selllcment at 
Reservoir 2. The utilidor and pipe encasement construction 
occurn:tl in stages utili1ing re-usable wooden gang forms 
(Fig. X). Upon completion of the work and the proper concrete 
t:ure penod, backfilling over th~ work tool- place. and the 
onginal construction grades were established. Seulement 
moiHtonng or the utrlidor structures ot:currcd throughout the 
bat:kfilling operation. 
As summer approached ncar the completion of the work. 
ambient air temperatures began to rise above 40 C during 
daylight hours. Concrete temperatures during placement where 
kept to a min1mum by requinng that plat:cmcnt oct:ur Juring 
n1ght sh1fts and cooling of the aggregates and water prior to 
batch111g the concrete with engmeering controls. Construction 
monitoring and quality control standards were maintained 
throughout the construction penod. Independent laboratory 
testing was performed for the concrete and backfi II placement 
opera! ions. 
The repatr was completed wtth1n the 5-month construction 
schetlule and within the $600.000 btd amount. Change orders 
requiring costs alterations to the contract were approxunately 
2ck of the lOtal contract value and no cla1ms occut-red. 
Upon completion of the work, the pipelines and water supply 
system were tested and turned over to the owner. The 
completed water supply and storage system was put tnlo 
service by the end of the summer of 1995 with all systems 
operating in accordance wnh the onginal design. 
Post-Repair Performance 
Since selllement of the utilidor was anticipated, a monitoring 
program was established within the utilidor structures. This 
monitoring program involved elevation surveys at mult1ple 
points on the utilidor and on the ptle t:ap within the ut1l1dor. 
The first month after construction, the maximum selllemcnts 
within the utilidors were as great as 26 em. 6 em. and 9 em 
between the reservoirs and A VVs 3. 2. and I, respectively. 
The post-construction selllements were typically greater at the 
higher fill areas (i.e .. adjacent to the reservoirs with 5.5 m of 
fi ll over the top of the utilidor). However. seulements were 
vanable at each location anti along the pipeline length 
The selllement'> decreased rap1dly withlll the next 6 months 
and after one year. \irtually no measurable senlement was 
occurring. The total maximum accumulative selllcment ol a 
single utilidor segment was 30 em for Reservoir 3. 7 em for 
Reservoir 2. and I 0 em for Reservoir I. Sint:e practically all 
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the post-repair performance settlements within the utilidors 
occurreJ rapidly, the settlement was attributed primarily to the 
adjustments of the fill material to the structural loads and 
construction ac.:tivities, rather than scUlcment induced by 
water. 
Over 1.2 m of clcaranc~ c.:urrcntly exists between the top of the 
pipe and the bottom of the utilidor. This clearance is ttwughl 
to he sufficient for any future settlement that might he induced 
by water ti"om irrigation or the park ahove the pipeline or from 
any future teaks in water lines. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Complex geotechnical suhsurfacc conditions occur 
cvcryv • ..-hcre, the goo-year old debris fill at the Darassa site in 
Cairo, Egypt was no exception. In this case, the subsuri~Kc 
materials consisted of a heterogeneous material with an unique 
behavior when subjected to excessive water. f<"or such 
conditions, efforts during the design procc<.;s must he allocated 
for completing geotechnical explorations, malerial testing, and 
engmccnng evaluations, and for prcpanng design 
recommendations as were conducted. 
However. unforeseen behavior c:m still occur, as did at the 
Darassa site. In this case the unfore~cen behavior led to a pipe 
failure and repair process. Based on the results of a thorough 
review of the failure, a relative unique design solutions 
involving usc of a llcxiblc concrete utilidor was developed to 
protect the pipeline from future failures. 
This case history demonstro.tes the importance of geotechnical 
explorations and design evaluations where complex 
geotechnical conditions occur. In addition, it demonstrates that 
careful and well-planned post-fmlurc evaluations can lead to 
the usc of innovative design alternatives. Also, usc of 
cooperative construction techniques, .-,uch as the 
design/constrw.:tion partncring arrangements ror the utilidor 
construction, can be used in all parts of the world and can 
result in a successful conclusion for repair/modification or any 
type of dcsignk:(mstruc.:ti(m work. 
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